We argued last year in this journal that extensive integration of research and care is a worthy goal of health system design, and we second the call from Ruth Faden and colleagues to move toward learning health care systems. As they recognize, learning health care systems demand the coordination of research and medical ethics—two sets of normative commitments that have long been considered distinct. In offering a novel ethics framework for such systems, Faden et al. advance the scholarly debate (...) about how best to do this and challenge us to think more deeply about its practical implications. However, we believe that at least three issues they raise require additional attention. First, the research‐care distinction has more normative bite than they are willing to concede. Second, the role for independent oversight requires clarification. Finally, they neglect the concept of stewardship as a guiding obligation of learning health care systems. (shrink)

We argued last year in this journal that extensive integration of research and care is a worthy goal of health system design, and we second the call from Ruth Faden and colleagues to move toward learning health care systems. As they recognize, learning health care systems demand the coordination of research and medical ethics—two sets of normative commitments that have long been considered distinct. In offering a novel ethics framework for such systems, Faden et al. advance the scholarly debate (...) about how best to do this and challenge us to think more deeply about its practical implications. However, we believe that at least three issues they raise require additional attention. First, the research‐care distinction has more normative bite than they are willing to concede. Second, the role for independent oversight requires clarification. Finally, they neglect the concept of stewardship as a guiding obligation of learning health care systems. (shrink)

I have come to believe that the whole framework of our current thought is about to begin a long and radical transformation, based on what I shall call a new science of pure consciousness. The content of most of the matters to be considered by this science have hitherto been the concern of some areas of religion, particularly what in our culture we call ‘mysticism’; but the treatment of it would legitimately be called scientific. Thus one aspect of the (...) transformation would be to overcome that apparent conflict between ‘science’ and ‘religion’, which has been so characteristic of our culture over the last few centuries. (shrink)

We present results from a single case study based on semi-structured interviews with a student (a boy in school year 3) diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and his school staff after participating in a short and small-scale intervention carried out in a socio-economically disadvantaged Swedish elementary school in 2019. The student participated in a seven week long intervention with a total of 12 philosophical dialogues (ranging from 45 to 60 minutes). Two facilitators, both with years of facilitation experience and (...) teacher degree and at least BA in philosophy, facilitated the majority of the dialogues and mainly followed a ”routine” procedure. The student was interviewed in direct connection to the end of the intervention about his experiences from the dialogues and his perceptions about whether and how the dialogues had influenced him. The student’s two teachers, who had participated in the dialogues as participants, were interviewed as a pair, also in direct connection to the end of the intervention, while the school principal was interviewed two years after the study. These staff interviews concerned the staff’s experiences of the influence of the dialogues on the students within the intervention as well as transfer effects to other contexts in school. The data from the study include detailed elaborations from a student perspective of different effects on the student’s communicative and cognitive development, which are in several respects supported also by staff reports. The results show that the student was able, interested, and willing to participate in philosophical dialogues, and our data point to several positive outcomes for the student in the communicative and cognitive domains. (shrink)

Though there is no international government, there are many international regimes that enact binding regulations on particular matters. They include the Basel II regime in banking, IFRS in accountancy, the FIRST computer incident response system, the WHO’s system for containing global epidemics and many others. They form in effect a very powerful international public sector based on technical expertise. Unlike the public services of nation states, they are almost free of accountability to any democratically elected body or to any legal (...) system. Although by and large they have acted for good, the dangers of long-term unaccountability are illustrated by the travesties of justice perpetrated by the International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Unduly Iterative Ethical Review?”Franklin G. MillerMadam:Renée C. Fox and Nicholas A. Christakis have written a provocative article, “Perish and Publish: Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation and Unduly Iterative Ethical Review” (KIEJ, December 1995). The language of their argument and some of the implicit assumptions on which it rests deserve critical scrutiny. They describe the articles presenting and commenting on the University of Pittsburgh protocol as “disquieting” because the display “trial-and-error (...) ethics.” To dismiss “trial-and-error ethics” implies that we antecedently possess all the moral knowledge we need to evaluate and regulate developments in medicine. Should we summarily reject experimentation in ethics, particularly with respect to complex issues involving scientific and technological changes? For if we need to reconsider and possibly revise what counts as moral knowledge, the proposing an experimental approach to the ethics of a novel practice, which is presented publicly and made open to revision, as in the Pittsburgh protocol, may be precisely the best way to proceed.Fox and Christakis resort to invidious insinuation in their criticism of ethicists who have written, and journals that have published, articles about non-heart-beating organ donation. Publication on this issue has given ethicists the opportunity of “adding numerous items to their vitae.” Their appraisal of the vitae-boosting behavior represents an interesting rhetorical specimen: “Although there is nothing inherently dishonorable about this it does create tension between two motives: conviction about the importance of perfecting ethical conduct, on the one hand, and the desire to advance one’s professional career, on the other” (p. 340). I am not sure what the authors mean by “perfecting ethical conduct.” Yet they suggest that a group of reputable scholars, who have taken diverse positions on the ethics of non-heart-beating organ donation, have come perilously close to venality.Finally, in order to avoid further legitimating what they consider to be an ethically objectionable practice, the authors advocate that journals exercise “restraint” in publishing articles about this topic. Perhaps in a future pronouncement they will enlighten us about how enforcing a publication policy that avoids the vice of “unduly iterative ethical review” might work without compromising freedom of discussion. Moral dogmatism and censorship have a long history of association.Franklin G. MillerCenter for Biomedical Ethics University of Virginia Charlottesville, VACopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This article engages the global displacement crisis by rendering the concept of ‘home’ as a theological problem for politics, linking contemporary geopolitical conflict to broader issues of forced migration. For help, we engage Simone Weil's theopolitical critique of domination‐based political organising, Hannah Arendt's insights into the texture of political space and belonging, and Jodi Dean's concept of a ‘collective desire for collectivity’ to propose a lateral, connective politics of home that secures local communities while also fostering global connection. Our constructive (...) theological proposal is that the power of love for home entails the embrace of neighbour (near and far) that moves beyond the usual options of liberal cosmopolitanism, communitarian localism, and the Realpolitik of geopolitical alliances. By reconsidering and intensifying the Christian concept of neighbour‐love and linking it to the common reality of displacement and the common longing for home, we take the first steps towards illuming and unveiling a political theology of home that is neither preferential nor naively inclusive. (shrink)

Crisis events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can have a devastating effect on communities and the care professionals within them. Over recent years, arts-based interventions have helped in a wide range of crisis situations, being recommended to support the workforce during and after complex crisis but there has been no systematic review of the role of arts-based crisis interventions and whether there are cogent themes regarding practice elements and outcomes. We, therefore, conducted a systematic review to (i) define the arts-based (...) change process used during and after crisis events, and (ii) explore the perceptions of intermediate and long-term mental health benefits of arts-based interventions for professionals in caring roles. Our search yielded six studies (all qualitative). All data were thematically aggregated and meta-synthesized, revealing seven practice elements (a safe place, focusing on strengths and protective factors, developing psychosocial competencies to support peers, emotional expression and processing, identifying and naming the impact of the crisis, using an integrative creative approach, and cultural and organizational sensitivity) applied across all six studies, as well as a range of intermediate and long-term benefits shared common features (adapting, growing, and recovering; using the community as a healing resource; reducing or preventing symptoms of stress or trauma reactions, psychophysiological homeostasis). The ways in which these studies were designed independently from one another and yet used the same practice elements in their crisis interventions indicates that there is comparability about how and why the arts-based practice elements are being used and to what effect. Our findings provide a sound basis and meaningful parameters for future research incorporating quantitative and qualitative approaches to firmly establish the effectiveness of art-based interventions, and how arts can support cultural sensitivity, acceptability and indicated outcomes, particularly those relating to stress and trauma during or following a crisis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Unduly Iterative Ethical Review?”Franklin G. MillerMadam:Renée C. Fox and Nicholas A. Christakis have written a provocative article, “Perish and Publish: Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation and Unduly Iterative Ethical Review” (KIEJ, December 1995). The language of their argument and some of the implicit assumptions on which it rests deserve critical scrutiny. They describe the articles presenting and commenting on the University of Pittsburgh protocol as “disquieting” because the display “trial-and-error (...) ethics.” To dismiss “trial-and-error ethics” implies that we antecedently possess all the moral knowledge we need to evaluate and regulate developments in medicine. Should we summarily reject experimentation in ethics, particularly with respect to complex issues involving scientific and technological changes? For if we need to reconsider and possibly revise what counts as moral knowledge, the proposing an experimental approach to the ethics of a novel practice, which is presented publicly and made open to revision, as in the Pittsburgh protocol, may be precisely the best way to proceed.Fox and Christakis resort to invidious insinuation in their criticism of ethicists who have written, and journals that have published, articles about non-heart-beating organ donation. Publication on this issue has given ethicists the opportunity of “adding numerous items to their vitae.” Their appraisal of the vitae-boosting behavior represents an interesting rhetorical specimen: “Although there is nothing inherently dishonorable about this it does create tension between two motives: conviction about the importance of perfecting ethical conduct, on the one hand, and the desire to advance one’s professional career, on the other” (p. 340). I am not sure what the authors mean by “perfecting ethical conduct.” Yet they suggest that a group of reputable scholars, who have taken diverse positions on the ethics of non-heart-beating organ donation, have come perilously close to venality.Finally, in order to avoid further legitimating what they consider to be an ethically objectionable practice, the authors advocate that journals exercise “restraint” in publishing articles about this topic. Perhaps in a future pronouncement they will enlighten us about how enforcing a publication policy that avoids the vice of “unduly iterative ethical review” might work without compromising freedom of discussion. Moral dogmatism and censorship have a long history of association.Franklin G. MillerCenter for Biomedical Ethics University of Virginia Charlottesville, VACopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as the Riemann hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. In recent decades, massive increases in computer power have permitted the gathering of huge amounts of numerical evidence, both for conjectures in pure mathematics (...) and for the behavior of complex applied mathematical models and statistical algorithms. Mathematics has therefore become (among other things) an experimental science (though that has not diminished the importance of proof in the traditional style). We examine how the evaluation of evidence for conjectures works in mathematical practice. We explain the (objective) Bayesian view of probability, which gives a theoretical framework for unifying evidence evaluation in science and law as well as in mathematics. Numerical evidence in mathematics is related to the problem of induction; the occurrence of straightforward inductive reasoning in the purely logical material of pure mathematics casts light on the nature of induction as well as of mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the Riemann Hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. It is argued here that it is not adequate to describe the relation of evidence to hypothesis as `subjective', `heuristic' (...) or `pragmatic', but that there must be an element of what it is rational to believe on the evidence, that is, of non-deductive logic. (shrink)

The late twentieth century saw two long-term trends in popular thinking about ethics. One was an increase in relativist opinions, with the “generation of the Sixties” spearheading a general libertarianism, an insistence on toleration of diverse moral views (for “Who is to say what is right? – it’s only your opinion.”) The other trend was an increasing insistence on rights – the gross violations of rights in the killing fields of the mid-century prompted immense efforts in defence of the (...) “inalienable” rights of the victims of dictators, of oppressed peoples, of refugees. The obvious incompatibility of those ethical stances, one anti-objectivist, the other objectivist in the extreme, proved no obstacle to their both being held passionately, often by the same people. (shrink)

Australian women who are university graduates have fewer children than non-graduates. In most cases this appears to be the result of circumstantial pressures not preference. Long years of study fill the most fertile years of women students and new graduates need further time to establish their careers. The chance of medical infertility increases with age so, for some, this means that childbearing is not postponed but ruled out. Graduates who do make the transition from university to professional work find (...) that working hours are long and that professional occupations are now both highly demanding and insecure. Women who take time off to care for young children must depend on one insecure income (their partner’s) rather than two, and their return to work is uncertain. These difficulties of time, money and insecurity are compounded by problems in finding a suitable partner. They are magnified by the enduring tendency of women to marry up. Thus it can be more difficult for women graduates to find husbands than it is for women who are non-graduates. (shrink)

But Williams had created a field of historical study, where his white counterparts had not. Single-handedly and without the blessing or approval of the academic community, Williams had called attention to the importance of including Afro-Americans in any acceptable and comprehensive history of the nation long before the historians of various groups of European-Americans or Asian-Americans had begun to advocate a similar treatment for their groups. And if Williams did not impress the white professional historians, he gave heart and (...) encouragement to future Afro-American historians. When the History of the Negro Troops appeared in 1887, nineteen-year-old W. E. B. Du Bois was a college senior at Fisk University and editor-in-chief of the student magazine, The Fisk Herald. In the columns of the Herald Du Bois wrote, "At last we have a historian; not merely a Negro historian, but a man who judged by his merits alone has written a splendid narrative. The Herald congratulates George W. Williams, and the race, which may justly be . . . [proud] of him."1 Many years later, Carter G. Woodson, the founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History and of the Journal of Negro History, described Williams' History of the Negro Troops as "one of the most valuable accounts of the Civil War."2 With words like these from Du Bois and Woodson, on whose shoulders much of the second stage of Afro-American historiography would rest, it is not too much to say that George Washington Williams was responsible for the beginnings of Afro-American historiography. · 1. The Fisk Herald, January 1888, p. 8.· 2. Woodson's appraisal of Williams was found among his papers and made available to me by Dr. Charles H. Wesley when he was executive director of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, which had been founded by Woodson in 1915. John Hope Franklin, president-elect of the American Historical Society, has written a biography of George Washington Williams. He is the John Matthews Manly Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Chicago and the author of, among other works, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans and A Southern Odyssey: Travelers in the Antebellum North. (shrink)

Excerpt from Lincoln and Public Morality Finally, there were the problems related to the prosecution of the war and to the aims for which it was being fought. If this did not bear directly on such matters as graft and dishonesty, it was no less related to the basic problem of public morality. For it was not only desirable but perhaps even necessary for national survival to discuss honestly and forthrightly the war aims. The risks in misrepresentation or dishonesty were (...) formidable, and any leader who was unwilling to enunciate a position on the critical questions of the day was courting personal and national disaster. Lincoln had no intention of doing either. Too long, even before the secession crisis, he had spoken for Union above all, and if he was committee to an ideal of freedom for all it was to be achieved and maintained in an indestructible union. His unequivocal posi tion in this regard was, in a sense, a measure of his high public morality. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Aristotle divided arguments that persuade into the rhetorical (which happen to persuade), the dialectical (which are strong so ought to persuade to some degree) and the demonstrative (which must persuade if rightly understood). Dialectical arguments were long neglected, partly because Aristotle did not write a book about them. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth century late scholastic authors such as Medina, Cano and Soto developed a sound theory of probable arguments, those that have logical and not merely psychological force (...) but fall short of demonstration. Informed by late medieval treatments of the law of evidence and problems in moral theology and aleatory contracts, they considered the reasons that could render legal, moral, theological, commercial and historical arguments strong though not demonstrative. At the same time, demonstrative arguments became better understood as Galileo and other figures of the Scientific Revolution used mathematical proof in arguments in physics. Galileo moved both dialectical and demonstrative arguments into mathematical territory. (shrink)

Given the long‐standing controversy about whether the brain‐dead should be considered alive in an irreversible coma or dead despite displaying apparent signs of life, the ethical and policy issues posed when family members insist on continued treatment are not as simple as commentators have claimed. In this article, we consider the kind of policy that should be adopted to manage a family's insistence that their brain‐dead loved one continues to receive supportive care. We argue that while it would be (...) ethically inappropriate to continue to devote scarce acute care resources to such patients in a hospital setting, it may not be ethically inappropriate for patients to receive these resources in certain other settings. Thus, if a family insists on continuing to care for their brain‐dead loved at their home, we should not, from a policy perspective, interfere with the family's wishes. We also argue that healthcare professionals should make some effort to facilitate the transfer of brain‐dead patients to these other settings when families insist on continued treatment despite being informed about the lack of any potential for recovery of consciousness. Our arguments are strengthened by the fact that patients in a persistent vegetative state, who, when correctly diagnosed, also have no potential for recovery of consciousness, are routinely transferred from hospitals to nursing homes or long‐term care facilities where they continue to be ventilated, tube fed and to receive other supportive care. We also briefly explore the question of who should be responsible for the costs of such treatment at the long‐term care facility. (shrink)

Controversies about the diagnosis and meaning of brain death have existed as long as the concept itself. Here we review the historical development of brain death, and then evaluate the various attempts to justify the claim that patients who are diagnosed as brain dead can be considered dead for all legal and social purposes, and especially with regard to procuring their vital organs for transplantation. While we agree with most commentators that death should be defined as the loss of (...) integration of the functioning of the organism as a whole, we conclude that patients diagnosed as brain dead have not, in fact, lost this integrated functioning. We close with reflections on the implications of this conclusion generally and particularly with regard to organ transplantation, and briefly make reference to alternative approaches to justifying the procurement of transplantable organs that do not depend upon a flawed approach to the diagnosis of death. (shrink)

Given the long-standing controversy about whether the brain-dead should be considered alive in an irreversible coma or dead despite displaying apparent signs of life, the ethical and policy issues posed when family members insist on continued treatment are not as simple as commentators have claimed. In this article, we consider the kind of policy that should be adopted to manage a family's insistence that their brain-dead loved one continues to receive supportive care. We argue that while it would be (...) ethically inappropriate to continue to devote scarce acute care resources to such patients in a hospital setting, it may not be ethically inappropriate for patients to receive these resources in certain other settings. Thus, if a family insists on continuing to care for their brain-dead loved at their home, we should not, from a policy perspective, interfere with the family's wishes. We also argue that healthcare professionals should make some effort to facilitate the transfer of brain-dead patients to these other settings when families insist on continued treatment despite being informed about the lack of any potential for recovery of consciousness. Our arguments are strengthened by the fact that patients in a persistent vegetative state, who, when correctly diagnosed, also have no potential for recovery of consciousness, are routinely transferred from hospitals to nursing homes or long-term care facilities where they continue to be ventilated, tube fed and to receive other supportive care. We also briefly explore the question of who should be responsible for the costs of such treatment at the long-term care facility. (shrink)

To describe a book as “long-awaited” is a reviewer's cliché. In the case of this book, however, it is a gross understatement. Materials for the new edition of Malalas were initially assembled by K. Weierholt. In the mid–1970s, after Weierholt's death, the project was taken over by Hans Thurn. By the time of Thurn's own death in 1993 the edition was almost ready, but still a further seven years, and the assistance of several other scholars, were required before Ioannis (...) Malalae Chronographia finally appeared. In the interim we had the curious phenomenon of the “Australian Malalas” — an English translation and apparatus based on a far fuller set of testimonia than the edition on which it was principally based (Dindorf's Bonn edition of 1831, shorn of that edition's misreadings of the main witness, MS Baroccianus Graecus 182 in the Bodleian Library). (shrink)

Christine Ladd-Franklin is often hailed as a guiding star in the history of women in logic—not only did she study under C. S. Peirce and was one of the first women to receive a PhD from Johns Hopkins, she also, according to many modern commentators, solved a logical problem which had plagued the field of syllogisms since Aristotle. In this paper, we revisit this claim, posing and answering two distinct questions: Which logical problem did Ladd-Franklin solve in her (...) thesis, and which problem did she think she solved? We show that in neither case is the answer “a long-standing problem due to Aristotle.” Instead, what Ladd-Franklin solved was a problem due to Jevons that was first articulated in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Franklin (U. of Colorado) challenges the postmodern or constructivist criticism of science and the post-Kuhnsian climate that dismisses science as a bit of a shady business. His nine essays, most previously published, defend science as a reasonable enterprise based on valid experimental evidence and critical discussion, which provides people with knowledge of the physical world. After establishing his own view of constructivism and postmodernism, he sets out four case studies then uses them to examine issues such as how discord (...) between experimental results is resolved, the calibration of experimental apparatus, and its legitimate use in validating results, and how experimental results provide reasonable grounds for a belief in both the truth of physical theories and the existence of the entities the theories concern. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: From Modernity to Enlightenment: The Historical Emergence of Liberalism A Genealogy of Race and its Intersections with Early Expressions of Liberalism Contemporary Egalitarian Liberalism and the Marginalization of Race The New Enlightenment: Race Consciousness in the Service of Social Justice Notes Bibliography.

In my dissertation, I develop the idea that Nietzsche's perspectivism constitutes a thesis on subjectivity, i.e., a thesis that asserts the indeterminate nature of both reality and the issue of human significance. Simply put, I contend that Nietzsche's perspectivism connotes a broad ranging anti-foundationalism that denies not only the reality of a fixed world of being, but also the idea that human significance is objectively defined in terms of a universal human ideal. ;In addition, I also argue that although Nietzsche (...) heralds the idea of subjectivity, in so far as he develops his perspectivism, he is himself unable to come to terms with it. More precisely, I contend that rather than overcoming a psychological need for objectivity, Nietzsche satiates this need by developing a naturalized account of existence, one that he ultimately appeals to as a means of justifying his own peculiar conception of human significance. ;Structurally, the insights of this project emerge as a consequence of three different discussions. The first is a preliminary discussion that sets the stage for an historical treatment of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Highlighting the fact that much of the contemporary focus on Nietzsche's perspectivism is motivated by a desire to establish the overall consistency of his thought, this first discussion explores the character and shortcomings of the conservative attempt to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as wholly committed to truth and the radical attempt to interpret it as a complete abandonment of truth. ;Concentrating exclusively on the historical development of Nietzsche's perspectivism, the second discussion focuses on the shift from what first emerges as a very conservative thesis concerning the structure of cognition and the possibility of knowledge to what later emerges as a very radical and broad ranging anti-foundationalism. Highlighting the tension between the pluralistic implications of this perspectivism and the dogmatic nature of many other aspects of Nietzsche's thought, the third discussion explores the psychological underpinnings of Nietzsche's philosophical inconsistency. (shrink)

Scientific articles exemplify standard functional units constraining argumentative structures. Severe space limitations demand every paragraph and illustration contribute to establishing the paper's claims. Philosophical testing and confirmation models should take into account each paragraph, table, and illustration. Hypothetico-Deductive, Bayesian Inductive, and Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation models do not, garbling the logic of papers. Micro-analysis of the fundamental paper in plate tectonics reveals an argumentative structure commonplace in science but ignored by standard philosophical accounts that cannot be dismissed as mere rhetorical embellishment. Papers with (...) illustrations often display a second argumentative structure differing from the text's. Constraints on adequate testing and confirmation analyses are adduced. “Experiments are about the assembly of persuasive arguments, ones that will stand up in court. … The task at hand is to capture the building-up of a persuasive argument about the world even in the absence of the logician's certainty.”—Galison, How Experiments End, 277. (shrink)

We propose protein localization dependent signal activation (PLDSA) as a model to describe pre‐existing protein partitioning between the cytosol, and membrane surface, as a means to modulate signal activation, specificity, and robustness. We apply PLDSA to explain possible molecular links between type II diabetes mellitus (T2DM) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) by describing Ca+2‐mediated interactions between the Src non‐receptor tyrosine kinase and p52Shc adaptor protein. We suggest that these interactions may serve as a contributing factor to disease development and progression. In (...) particular, we propose that signaling response is regulated, in part, by Ca+2‐mediated partitioning of lipid‐bound and soluble forms of Src and p52shc. Thus, protein‐protein interactions that drive signaling in response to extracellular ligand binding are also mediated by partitioning of signaling proteins between membrane‐bound and soluble populations. We propose that PLDSA effects may explain, in part, the evolutionary basis of promiscuous protein interaction domains and their importance in cellular function. (shrink)

One way of conceptualizing community engaged teaching is as a mode of teaching that directly foregrounds engaging communities who are experiencing particular social realities that are theorized and discussed in classroom settings. Tracing the trajectory of community engaged teaching from the pedagogical paradigm of civil rights era Freedom Schools to contemporary manifestations of their legacy, the author offers two narrative accounts. The first is an account of the emergence of Freedom Schools as quintessential examples of community engaged teaching that exemplify (...) the character and aims of public philosophy as social praxis. The second is an illustrative account of the lessons to be drawn from the Freedom Schools by all who aspire to pursue community engaged teaching in a manner that extends their legacy. Ironically, the racist deployment of the system of education served as the impetus for what took shape as the Freedom Summer's emphasis on radical, liberation‐oriented, and mutually transformative modes of community‐engaged teaching. (shrink)

Leaders in today's world face the challenge of earning the trust and commitment of organizational members if they expect to guide their companies to success in a highly competitive global context. In this article, we present empirical results indicating that when leadership behaviors are perceived as trustworthy through the observer's mediating lens, trust increases and leaders are more likely to be viewed as ethical stewards who honor a higher level of duties. This article contributes to the growing body of literature (...) about the importance of ethical stewardship in the trust relationship. (shrink)

_Explores convergences between the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche and African American thought._.

Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent’s contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since these states and events leave (...) it open which decision he will make, he does not settle which decision occurs, and thus “disappears.” My aim is to explain why this argument fails. In particular, I demonstrate that event-causal libertarians can dismantle the argument by enriching the reductive base in their analysis of free will to include a state that plays the functional role of the self-determining agent and with which the agent is identified. (shrink)

Modern philosophy of mathematics has been dominated by Platonism and nominalism, to the neglect of the Aristotelian realist option. Aristotelianism holds that mathematics studies certain real properties of the world – mathematics is neither about a disembodied world of “abstract objects”, as Platonism holds, nor it is merely a language of science, as nominalism holds. Aristotle’s theory that mathematics is the “science of quantity” is a good account of at least elementary mathematics: the ratio of two heights, for example, is (...) a perceivable and measurable real relation between properties of physical things, a relation that can be shared by the ratio of two weights or two time intervals. Ratios are an example of continuous quantity; discrete quantities, such as whole numbers, are also realised as relations between a heap and a unit-making universal. For example, the relation between foliage and being-a-leaf is the number of leaves on a tree,a relation that may equal the relation between a heap of shoes and being-a-shoe. Modern higher mathematics, however, deals with some real properties that are not naturally seen as quantity, so that the “science of quantity” theory of mathematics needs supplementation. Symmetry, topology and similar structural properties are studied by mathematics, but are about pattern, structure or arrangement rather than quantity. (shrink)

Death and immortality played a central role in Greek and Roman thought, from Homer and early Greek philosophy to Marcus Aurelius. In this book A. G. Long explains the significance of death and immortality in ancient ethics, particularly Plato's dialogues, Stoicism and Epicureanism; he also shows how philosophical cosmology and theology caused immortality to be re-imagined. Ancient arguments and theories are related both to the original literary and theological contexts and to contemporary debates on the philosophy of death. The (...) book will be of major interest to scholars and students working on Greek and Roman philosophy, and to those wishing to explore ancient precursors of contemporary debates about death and its outcomes. (shrink)

In this article I suggest a tripartite classification of scientific activity; discovery, pursuit, and justification. I believe that such a classification can give us a more adequate description of scientific practice, help illuminate the various roles that evidence plays in science, and may also help to partially resolve differences between “constructivist” and “epistemologist” views of science. I argue that although factors suggested by the constructivists such as career goals, professional interests, utility for future practice, and agreement with existing commitments do (...) enter into pursuit, it is experimental evidence that is decisive in justification. I illustrate this with two case studies from the history of contemporary science, experiments on atomic parity violation and their relation to the Weinberg-Salam unified theory of electroweak interactions and the fifth force in gravity. I also answer some of the criticisms offered of my earlier account of the episode of atomic parity violation. (shrink)